A strong rupee is giving policymakers a new sort of headache

　　THE Indian finance ministry's mid-year review, released this week, sees the external sector as a silver lining around the country's huge fiscal deficit. "Buoyant" and "encouraging" are the words used to describe three consecutive quarters of current-account surplus--the first in a quarter-century. Add to that swelling foreign-exchange reserves and a stronger rupee, and some are arguing that it is time for drastic liberalisation of India's foreign-exchange regime. They could be disappointed.
　　For most of the past decade, the nominal value of the rupee has been allowed to decline gently against the dollar, by about 5% a year, thus staying fairly steady in real terms. This year, however, it has been appreciating in real terms (and, since June, nominally as well). It would have done so more sharply had the central bank not been buying dollars with gusto. Exporters of manufactured goods, obsessed with price competition from China, are aghast at the rise--and at the prospect held out by some forecasters that a sustained boom in India's IT exports means it will continue.
　　The rupee's recent strength is only partly related to India's prowess in software and the mushrooming of "business-process outsourcing" in such projects as call-centres. The chunky surplus on invisibles owes more to remittances: non-resident Indians, attracted by the stability of the rupee and its higher interest rates, have been moving their offshore deposits back home. Similarly, Indian companies are borrowing more in dollars without selling rupees forward to hedge repayments. The trade deficit, meanwhile, has been shrinking, as imports grow slowly.
　　The inflows have boosted foreign-exchange reserves by some $20 billion this year, to $66 billion, or 12 months'-worth of imports. The size of this cushion has triggered some calls for further liberalisation of the labyrinthine foreign-exchange controls that India still maintains, despite the move in 1993 towards rupee convertibility for trade purposes. In recent months, some controls have duly been eased. It is now simpler, for example, for individuals to open foreign-currency bank accounts, and for travellers to get hold of foreign exchange. And non-resident Indians have been allowed to take out money acquired through inheritance, or from rents and dividends.
　　Some commentators have taken all this as a harbinger of full capital-account convertibility. That is not on the cards. The experience of 1991, when India ran out of money, has left the central bank prone to caution--an approach it felt was vindicated by the East Asian crisis of 1997-98. With war in Iraq looming and a turbulent oil market, some risk aversion is understandable. India's fiscal deficit--some 10% of GDP and widening--is another reason for moving slowly. Just as one rating agency, Moody's, is considering upgrading India's external debt, another, Fitch, has warned that its local-currency rating is under threat. Nor is it certain that opening the capital account would mean a weaker rupee. It might even attract more capital inflows. As India's exporters are learning, convertibility is a two-way street.
　　注(1)：本文选自Economist;12/7/2002, p73, 1/3p;

　　1.The expression “silver lining” (Line 2, Paragraph 1) most probably means______.
　　[A] a side effect
　　[B] a favorable aspect
　　[C] a decorative line
　　[D] a comforting prospect

　　2.According to the text, the appreciation of the rupee in real terms__________.
　　[A] will lower its nominal value
　　[B] is bad news to exporters of manufactured goods
　　[C] means a sharper decline of its nominal value against the dollar
　　[D] will give impetus to the development of India’s IT industry

　　3.The current account surplus owes to the following EXCEPT_________.
　　[A] the strength of the rupee
　　[B] the remittances of non-resident Indians
　　[C] the hedging activity of Indian companies
　　[D] the growing imports

　　4.Which of the following is true according to the text?
　　[A] India’s foreign exchange reserves increased more than three times this year.
　　[B] Individuals are now allowed to trade foreign currency freely.
　　[C] India now can tackle adverse events in the foreign exchange market better
　　[D] India’s foreign exchange controls are seen as a hamper to its economic development.

　　5.Which of the follow is NOT a reason for India’s slow response to calls for liberalization of its foreign exchange?
　　[A] Its increasing foreign reserve.
　　[B] Its past experience.
　　[C] Uncertainty of the oil market.
　　[D] Its growing fiscal deficit.

　　答案：DBDCA

　　篇章剖析
　　本篇文章是一篇说明文，针对印度外汇储备增加，卢比走强是否会对印度的外汇管制政策产生影响进行了分析。第一段介绍了印度外汇储备增加，卢比走强的财政情况，并提出本文主要观点：印度也许并不会大幅放开对外汇的管制。第二段介绍了卢比升值的情况。第三段介绍了卢比升值带来的影响---外汇流入。第四段介绍了外汇储备增加的情况以及政府适度放松外汇管制。第五段分析了政府不会大幅放开外汇管制的原因，并得出自己的结论：外币兑换是一条双行道。

　　题目分析
　　1. 答案为D，属猜词题。根据上下文，印度的财政赤字非常大，但印度的外汇储备不断增加，并且连续三个季度的经常项目账户盈余，显然，对外部门给巨额财政赤字带来了一线希望。四个选项中，只有A的意义最符合。
　　2. 答案为B，属事实细节题。文章第二段制造品出口商听到卢比升值消息时的反应是"aghast”，这个词的意思是“吃惊的；吓呆的”，可见这条消息对他们来说是坏消息。
　　3. 答案为D，属事实细节题。文章第三段指出了印度经常项目账户盈余的几个原因：卢比的强势，海外印度人的汇款，印度公司为了套期保值而借入美元却不卖出卢比的行为，以及贸易赤字的缩小。而贸易赤字缩小的原因是进口增长缓慢。所以进口的不断增长不是导致经常项目账户盈余的原因。
　　4. 答案为C，属事实细节题。根据文章第四段第二行，印度外汇储备的大幅增加到660亿美元，因此一些人认为印度已经有了一个可以放心开放外汇控制的cushion。这个词的意思是“缓冲不利影响的东西”，显然现在的印度能够更从容地应付外汇市场的不利情况。
　　5. 答案为A，属事实细节题。根据上下文，人们呼吁印度放宽外汇控制的原因是印度的外汇储备不断增加，卢比也不断走强。A项中的答案正好因果颠倒了。

　　参考译文
　　印度财政部长本周发布了年中报告，报告认为对外部门给该国巨额财政赤字带来了一线希望。“行情看涨”和“令人鼓舞”这些词被用来形容1/4世纪以来首次连续三个季度的经常项目账户盈余。随着外汇储备的膨胀和卢比的增强，一些人认为大幅放开印度外汇管制的时候到了。不过他们也许会失望。
　　在过去十年中的大部分时候，卢比的面值被允许以每年约5%的幅度相对于美元温和地贬值，因此它的实际价值是相当稳定的。然而，在今年，卢比的实际价值一直在升值（而且，自六月以来，其面值也在上扬）。如果不是中央银行一直在积极买入美元，卢比的升值幅度会更高。对饱受中国产品价格竞争困扰的制造品出口商来说，卢比升值的消息令人心惊肉跳。一些预测者认为，由于印度信息产业出口还将持续繁荣，卢比将继续升值。
　　卢比最近的强势与印度在软件业的实力以及最近兴起的将电话中心等项目的业务流程外包有一定的关系。相当的无形收支项目盈余主要来自汇款：受卢比的稳定性和高利率的吸引，那些旅居他乡的印度人一直在将他们的海外存款汇回家乡。与此类似，印度公司也贷入更多美元，同时不卖出远期卢比以便偿还美元贷款时能够套期保值。在此期间由于进口增长缓慢，贸易赤字也在不断减少。
　　外汇的流入使得外汇贮备在今年快速增长了大约200亿美元，达到了660亿美元，相当于12个月的进口总额。尽管在1993年印度已允许进行以贸易为目的的卢比兑换，但印度目前的外汇控制如迷宫般复杂。现在有了这样的巨额储备作保障，一些人开始呼吁印度政府进一步放开现有外汇控制。最近几个月来，一些外汇控制已经被适当放松。比如，个人开设外汇银行账户、旅游者持有外汇都比以前要简单很多。此外旅居国外的印度人也可转出遗产继承收入，或租金、利息收入。
　　一些评论员将上述情况视为资本账户可完全兑换的先兆。然而这个可能性并不大。1991年印度用完外汇储备的经历使中央银行倾向于谨慎方式——1997-98年的东亚危机证实了这种方式的正确性。随着伊拉克战争的临近，以及石油市场的波动，进行一些风险转移是可以理解的。印度的财政赤字—约为GDP的10%且正在扩大—是另一个开放动作缓慢的原因。在穆迪(Moody’s)这个评级机构考虑提升印度外债的等级的同时，另一个评级机构，惠誉(Fitch)则警告说它的本地货币评级处境堪忧。放开资本账户并不一定意味着削弱卢比，说不定它还会吸引更多的资本流入。外币兑换是一条双行道，这一点印度的出口商们也越来越有感触。